Monday, November 11, 2013

Capital Structure Dynamics And Transitory Debt



Our guest blogger this week is Dr. Harry DeAngelo, the Kenneth King Stonier Chair in Business Administration at the Marshall School of Business at USC. Dr. DeAngelo is a noted expert on payout policy, capital structure, and corporate governance. Here, Dr. DeAngelo discusses how transitory debt can affect the capital structure decision. For a more detailed analysis, you can read the entire paper "Capital Structure Dynamics and Capital Structure" here. 

According to the tradeoff theory of capital structure, firms select an optimal leverage ratio by balancing the tax advantages of debt against the potential costs of financial distress.

For simplicity, consider a version of the tradeoff theory in which firms face a corporate tax rate of 35%. Interest payments are tax deductible, but dividend payments are not. Suppose also that any debt-to-assets ratio over 0.45 is almost certain to result in costly financial distress while those less than or equal to 0.45 imply no chance of distress.  The latter knife-edge structure is, of course, unrealistic. But let’s stick with the assumption in order to illustrate an economically important feature of corporate capital structure decisions that is omitted from the traditional tradeoff arguments about optimal capital structure.

What is the optimal capital structure for our hypothetical firm? According to the traditional tradeoff logic, the optimal leverage ratio is 0.45. The firm gets maximum tax benefits by levering up to 0.45, and it runs no risk of incurring financial distress costs. So, by the usual tradeoff logic, the optimal strategy is to fully exhaust debt capacity (take leverage up 0.45) to capture the tax benefits of debt.

That logic is fine in a simple static setting in which a firm is only concerned with balancing tax benefits and distress costs while holding investment policy fixed.

But things change fundamentally when we look at the problem dynamically and recognize that debt policy is about more than finding the right mix of interest and dividend payouts. Importantly, firms issue debt because it is a low (transaction and asymmetric information) cost vehicle for raising funds for investment.

It is no longer attractive for the firm to lever all the way up to 0.45. Why not? The reason is that the firm would like to have unused borrowing capacity that it can tap in the future if a really attractive investment opportunity arrives. The rational policy is to keep some “dry powder” – untapped debt capacity – available. The one exception would be if the firm currently had an outstanding investment opportunity and probable future investment opportunities that are much less attractive.  In that case, it would be rational to exhaust debt capacity today instead of saving “dry powder” for future use.

What should a firm with untapped debt capacity do when an attractive investment opportunity arrives and it doesn’t have sufficient resources to fund it? In most cases, the right response is to borrow to fund that investment and then use future earnings to pay down debt and restore the option to borrow to meet future funding needs.

The firm’s ideal “target” leverage ratio is less than 0.45 once one takes into account the value of the option to borrow to meet future funding needs.

Traditional tradeoff theories view corporate capital structures as having only “permanent” debt and equity components. The dynamic theory that we have sketched here recognizes that capital structures also have a “transitory” debt component that involves the exercise of the option to borrow and then the restoration of that option by subsequently paying down debt.

You can think of this view of capital structure as the corporate analog of the manner in which a rational individual will manage his or her credit card: Use the borrowing capacity to meet unanticipated funding needs and then repay the debt to free up debt capacity for future use.

The logic here is based on “Capital Structure Dynamics and Transitory Debt” by Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, and Toni Whited in the Journal of Financial Economics (2011, pp. 235-261).